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We develop a behavioral macroeconomic model in which agents use simple but biased rules 
to forecast future output and inflation. This model generates endogenous waves of optimism 
and pessimism (“Animal Spirits”) that are generated by the correlation of biased beliefs. We 
contrast the dynamics of this model with a stylized DSGE-version of the model and we study 
the implications for monetary policies. One of our main results is that strict inflation targeting 
is suboptimal because it gives more scope for waves of optimism and pessimism to emerge 
thereby destabilizing output and inflation. 
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The idea that “animal spirits” drive the business cycle has been at the core of the 
macroeconomic dynamics described by Keynes. These “animal spirits” are defined as 
waves of optimism and pessimism gripping investors and consumers, and by having 
self-fulfilling properties, influencing output and investment. Although elusive as a 
concept, it has maintained a great popularity in discussions of the business cycle 
outside academia. 
As a result of the systematic incorporation of rational expectations in macroeconomic 
models, the concept of “animal spirits” has been discarded from modern 
macroeconomic theory. If expectations are rational, there is simply no room for 
animal spirits to exert an independent influence on economic activity. In the currently 
fashionable DSGE-models that incorporate the rational expectations hypothesis 
together with a new Keynesian framework of wage and price rigidities, there is no 
place for such independent waves of optimism and pessimism. In these models all 
fluctuations in investment and output are the result of exogenous shocks in 
preferences, endowments and technologies that are slowly transmitted into the 
economy. This combination of exogenous shocks and slow transmission (inertia) 
creates cyclical movements in these models. In this sense the cyclical movements in 
output and prices in DSGE-models are created exogenously.  
There have been serious attempts to incorporate the notion of “animal spirits” in 
dynamic general equilibrium models. This literature started with Azariadis(1981) and 
was further extended by Farmer and others (see Farmer and Guo(1994), Benhabib and 
Farmer(1994). These authors aim at developing rigorous models of the business cycle 
in which expectations are rational and aggregate fluctuations are driven by animal 
spirits. Typically these models produce multiple equilibria (sunspots). Together with 
random shocks they are capable of generating endogenous business cycles.  
In this paper we present an alternative approach to modeling animal spirits. We do 
this because we believe that the notions of “animal spirits” and rational expectations 
do not mix well. The assumption of rational expectations implies that agents 
understand the underlying model structure and the distribution of the shocks. It also 
means that agents use the same information set, and can therefore be represented by 
one individual, the representative agent, who understands the “Truth”. In such a 
  2framework it is difficult to understand how agents could be gripped by waves of 
optimism and pessimism.  
The notion of animal spirits as developed by Keynes is based on the fact that 
individuals do not understand the “Truth”. Individuals only understand small parts of 
the total information set, and they are not capable of describing the statistical 
distribution of economic shocks. The cognitive limitations of individuals have now 
been abundantly documented by psychologists and brain scientists (For recent 
surveys, see Kahneman and Thaler (2006) and Della Vigna(2007). See also 
Thaler(1994), Camerer and Lovallo, (1999), Read and van Leeuwen, 1998). As a 
result of these cognitive limitations, there is also heterogeneity in the use of 
information. 
The world of imperfect information and cognitive limitation of individuals is the 
world in which Keynes set up his idea of “animal spirits”. This is also the context in 
which this paper introduces them. We will take the view that agents face cognitive 
problems in understanding and processing information. As a result, they use simple 
rules ("heuristics") to guide their behaviour (see Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and 
Weinberg, 2006).  They do this not because they are irrational, but rather because the 
complexity of the world is overwhelming. In a way it can be said that using heuristics 
is a rational response of agents who are aware of their limited capacity to understand 
the world. The challenge when we try to model heuristics will be to introduce 
discipline in the selection of rules so as to avoid that “everything becomes possible”.  
In this paper we develop a parsimonious model capable of generating endogenous and 
self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism in an otherwise standard setup. We 
look for parsimony because we wish to find out what is the simplest possible model 
needed to generate such cycles.  As will become clear extremely simple rules are 
capable of generating a very complex dynamics.   
 
2. A behavioral macroeconomic model 
 
In this section we describe our modeling strategy. We do this by presenting a standard 
aggregate-demand-aggregate supply model augmented with a Taylor rule. The novel 
feature of the model is that agents use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the future. 
These rules are subjected to a selection mechanism. Put differently, agents will 
  3endogenously select the forecasting rules that have delivered the highest fitness in the 
past. This selection mechanism acts as a disciplining device on the kind of rules that 
are acceptable. Since agents use different heuristics we also obtain heterogeneity. 
This, as will be shown, creates endogenous business cycles.  
We will contrast this model with a similar model that incorporates rational 
expectations, and that we interpret as a stylized version of DSGE-models. This 
comparison will also allow us to focus on some crucial differences in the transmission 
of shocks, in particular of monetary policy shocks. 
Obviously, the approach presented here is not the only possible one. In fact, a large 
literature has emerged attempting to introduce imperfect information into 
macroeconomic models. These attempts have been based mainly on the statistical 
learning approach pioneered by Sargent(1993) and Evans and Honkapohja(2001). 
This literature leads to important new insights (see e.g. Gaspar and Smets(2006), 
Orphanides and Williams(2004), Milani(2007a)). However, we feel that this approach 
still loads individual agents with too many cognitive skills that they probably do not 
posses in the real world
1. A similar criticism can be developed against another 
approach at modeling imperfect information based on “rational inattention” (see 
Mackowiak and Wiederholt(2005), Sims(2005)). 
Our approach is also not the first attempt to introduce heuristics into macroeconomic 
models. Recently, Brazier et al. (2006) have done so in the context of an overlapping 
generations model, and Branch and Evans(2006) have developed models with 
imperfectly informed agents. In addition, there is a large literature of behavioural 
finance models that now incorporate the view that agents are limited in their cognitive 
skills and use heuristics to guide their behaviour and forecasting (see Brock and 
Hommes(1997), Lux and Marchesi(2000), De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006)).  
 
 
2.1 The model 
 
The model consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation 
and a Taylor rule.  
                                                 
1 See the fascinating book of Gigerenzer and Todd(1999) on the use of simple heuristics as compared 
to statistical (regression) learning.  
  4The aggregate demand equation can be derived from dynamic utility maximization. 
This produces an Euler equation in the same vain as in DSGE-models. We obtain  
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where yt is the output gap in period t, rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the rate of 
inflation, and εt is a white noise disturbance term.   t E
~
 is the expectations operator 
where the tilde above E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. We will 
specify this process subsequently.  We follow the procedure introduced in DSGE-
models of adding a lagged output in the demand equation. This is usually justified by 
invoking habit formation. We keep this assumption here as we want to compare the 
heuristic model with the DSGE-rational expectations model.  However, we will show 
in section 5 that we do not really need this inertia-building device to generate inertia 
in the endogenous variables.   
The aggregate supply equation can be derived from profit maximization of individual 
producers. We assume as in DSGE-models a Calvo pricing rule and the use of some 
indexation rule used in adjusting prices, which leads to a lagged inflation variable in 
the equation
2. The supply curve can also be interpreted as a New Keynesian Philips 
curve.  We obtain:  
t t t t t t y b b E b η π π π + + − + = − + 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 (
~
   (2) 
 
Finally the Taylor rule describes the behaviour of the central bank 
 
t t t t t t u r c y c c r + + + − = −1 3 2
*
1 ) ( π π      (3) 
 
where   is the inflation target which for the sake of convenience will be set equal to 
0. Note that we assume, as is commonly done, that the central bank smoothens the 
interest rate. This smoothing behaviour is represented by the lagged interest rate in 
equation (3). Ideally, the Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward looking 
inflation variable, i.e. central banks set the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts 
*
t π
                                                 
2 It is now standard in DSGE-models to use a pricing equation in which marginal costs enter on the 
right hand side. Such an equation is derived from profit maximisation in a world of imperfect 
competition. It can be shown that under certain conditions the aggregate supply equation (3) is 
equivalent to such a pricing equation (see Gali(2008), Smets and Wouters(2003)).  
  5about the rate of inflation. We have not done so here in order to maintain simplicity in 
the model.   
We assume that agents use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the future output and 
inflation. The way we proceed is as follows. We start with a very simple heuristics for 
forecasting and apply it to the forecasting rules of future output. We assume that 
because agents do not fully understand how the output gap is determined, their 
forecasts are biased. We assume that some agents are optimistic and systematically 
bias the output gap upwards, others are pessimistic and systematically bias the output 
gap downwards.  
 
The optimists are defined by   t t
opt
t g y E = +1
~
     (4) 
 
The pessimists are defined by  t t
pes
t g y E − = +1
~
   (5) 
where gt > 0 expresses the degree of bias in estimating the output gap. The expression 
 can be interpreted as the divergence in beliefs among agents about the 
output gap. We will assume that this divergence in beliefs is itself a function of the 
variance in the output gap. Thus we write 
t t g d 2 =
) var( t t y d δ β + =       ( 6 )  
where  0 ≥ β  and  0 ≥ δ . The logic is that when the uncertainty about the output gap 
increases the agents’ beliefs about the true output gap tend to diverge more. We will, 
however, also analyze the special case where δ = 0, i.e. the divergence in beliefs is 




Note that we do not consider this assumption of a simple bias to be a realistic 
representation of the how agents forecast. Rather is it a parsimonious representation 
of a world where agents do not know the “truth” (i.e. the underlying model) and have 
a biased view about this truth. It will be shown that such a simple assumption is 
capable of generating very complex waves of optimism and pessimisms. Our aim is 
also to contrast the dynamics obtained in a model using such a simple heuristics with 
the one obtained in models where agents are assumed to know the “truth”.  
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
 
  6pes
t t pes t
opt
t t opt t t E y E y E
~ ~ ~
, 1 , 1 α α + = + +   (7) 
 
g g y E t pes t opt t t , , 1
~
α α − = +      (8) 
 
and   1 , , = + t pes t opt α α      (9) 
 
where   t opt, α  and   t pes, α   are the weights of optimists, receptively, pessimists in the 
market. As will be shown later, this market forecast will turn out to be unbiased on 
average.  
A methodological issue arises here. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here 
are not derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex 
post, once the demand and supply equations are derived. This has also been the 
approach in the learning literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja(2001). Ideally 
one would like to derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in 
which agents experience cognitive problems. Our knowledge about how to model this 
behaviour at the micro level
3 and how to aggregate it is too sketchy, however, and we 
have not tried to do so.  
As indicated earlier, agents are rational in the sense that they continuously evaluate 
their forecast performance. We follow Brock and Hommes(1997) in specifying the 
procedure agents follow in this evaluation process. Recently, Branch and Evans(2006) 
also introduced this selection mechanism in a macroeconomic model.  
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where Uopt,t and Upes,t  are the forecast performances of the optimists and pessimists, 
respectively. These are defined as the mean squared forecasting errors (MSFEs) of the 
optimistic and pessimistic forecasting rules; ωk  are geometrically declining weights.  
 
3 Psychologists and brains scientists struggle to understand how our brain processes information. There 
is as yet no generally accepted model we could use to model the micro-foundations of information 
processing. 
  7The proportion of agents using the optimistic and the pessimistic forecasting rules is 
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Equation (12) says that as the past forecast performance of the optimists improves 
relative to that of the pessimists more agents will select the optimistic belief about the 
output gap for their future forecasts. As a result the proportion of agents using the 
optimistic rule increases. Equation (13) has a similar interpretation. The parameter γ 
measures the “intensity of choice”, i.e. the intensity with which agents allow their 
choice for a particular heuristic to depend on past forecast performance. In the limit 
when γ = ∞ only one, the best performing heuristic, will be selected.   
Note that this selection mechanism is the disciplining device introduced in this model 
on the kind of rules of behaviour that are acceptable. Only those rules that pass the 
fitness test remain in place. The others are weeded out. In contrast with the 
disciplining device implicit in rational expectations models which implies that agents 
have superior cognitive capacities, we do not have to make such an assumption here.  
It is also useful to point out that the selection mechanism used here can be interpreted 
as an evolutionary one that allows high forecasting performance to spread throughout 
the economy through replication.   
Agents also make forecasts of inflation in this model. At this stage of the analysis we 
will simply assume that all agents perceive the central bank’s announced inflation 







t t t E π π = +   (where for the sake of simplicity we assume the inflation target to be 
equal to 0). We will extend this simple inflation forecasting process in a later section 
when we will also assume that there is heterogeneity of beliefs in the inflation 
forecasting process. We keep homogeneity of beliefs here to focus on the impact of 
heterogeneity in the forecasting of future output gaps.   
                                                 
4 Such a specification is often used in discrete choice theory. See Anderson,  de Palma, and  Thisse, 
(1992) 
  8The solution of the model is found by first substituting (3) into (1) and rewriting in 
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where bold characters refer to matrices and vectors. The solution for Zt  is given by  
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t r     (15) 
 
The solution exists if the matrix A is non-singular, i.e. if (1-a2c2)a2b2c1 ≠ 0. The 
system (15) describes the solution for yt and πt given the forecasts of yt and πt . The 
latter have been specified in equations (4) to (13) and can be substituted into (15). 
Finally, the solution for rt  is found by substituting yt and πt obtained from (15) into 
(3).  
Our research strategy consists in comparing the dynamics of this heuristic model with 
the same structural model (aggregate demand equation (1), aggregate supply equation 
(2) and Taylor rule equation (3)) under rational expectations which we interpret as a 
stylized DSGE-model. .  














































































































































t 1 t t t t v  Z Λ Z E   Φ  Z Ω + + = −     (16) 
 
[ t 1 t t t
1
t v  Z Λ Z E   Φ   Ω  Z + + = −
− ]      (17) 
 
  9This model can be solved under rational expectations using the Binder-Pesaran(1996) 
procedure.  
 
2.2 Calibrating the behavioral and the rational model  
We proceed by calibrating the model. In appendix A we present the parameters used 
in the calibration exercise. We have calibrated the model in such a way that the time 
units can be considered to be months. In section 5 we present a sensitivity analysis of 
the main results to changes in the main parameters of the model.  
We show the results of a simulation exercise in which the three shocks (demand 
shocks, supply shocks and interest rate shocks) are i.i.d. with standard deviations of 
0.5%.  
We first present a simulation in the time domain. Figure 1 shows the time pattern of 
output and inflation produced by the behavioral model. We observe a strong cyclical 
movement in the output gap. The source of these cyclical movements is seen to be the 
weight of optimists and pessimists in the market (see second panel of figure 1). The 
model in fact generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. During some 
periods pessimists dominate and this translates into below average output growth. 
These pessimistic periods are followed by optimistic ones when optimistic forecasts 
tend to dominate and the growth rate of output is above average. These waves of 
optimism and pessimism are essentially unpredictable. Other realizations of the 
shocks produce different cycles with the same general characteristics.  
These endogenously generated cycles in output are made possible by a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that can be described as follows. A series of random shocks creates the 
possibility that one of the two forecasting rules, say the optimistic one, delivers a 
higher payoff, i.e. a lower mean squared forecast error (MSFE). This attracts agents 
that were using the pessimistic rule. The “contagion-effect” leads to an increasing use 
of the optimistic belief to forecast the output-gap, which in turn stimulates aggregate 
demand. Optimism is therefore self-fulfilling. A boom is created. At some point, 
negative stochastic shocks make a dent in the MSFE of the optimistic forecasts. The 
pessimistic belief becomes attractive and therefore fashionable again. The economy 
turns around.   
  10These waves of optimism and pessimism can be understood to be searching 
mechanisms of agents who do not fully understand the underlying model but are 
continuously searching for the truth. An essential characteristics of this searching 
mechanism  is  that it leads to systematic correlation in beliefs (either optimistic or 
pessimistic ones). This systematic correlation is at the core of the booms and busts 
created in the model. Note, however, that when computed over a significantly large 
period of time the average error in the forecasting goes to zero. In this sense, the 
forecast bias tends to disappear asymptotically. 
 
  Figure 1: Output gap and inflation in behavioral model 


























































From figure 1 (third panel) we observe that inflation is relatively stable and fluctuates 
around the target (set at 0) in a relatively narrow band. This result has everything to 
do with our assumption that agents are homogeneous in giving full credibility to the 
inflation target of the central bank. We will return to this when we introduce 
heterogeneity among agents in their perception of the credibility of the central bank’s 
inflation target.  
We contrast these results with those obtained using the model under rational 
expectations. We use the same structural model with the same parameter values for 
the aggregate demand, supply and Taylor equations. In addition the shocks are the 
same with the same iid structure.  
We show the results in figure 2. Two differences stand out. First the rational 
expectations model does not produce clear cyclical movements in the output gap. In a 
way this is not surprising: the shocks are white noise and the transmission mechanism 
exhibits a minimal degree of inertia. In full-fledged DSGE-models the inertia is more 
complex and the shocks typically exhibit autoregressive patterns that are important in 
producing cyclical movements in output. Thus our results confirm that the cycles 
produced in the DSGE models come to a large extent from outside the model. We 
return to this issue in section 6 where we analyze the degree of inertia produced by the 
two models.  
Second, the volatility of output and inflation is higher in the rational expectations 
model compared to the behavioral model. This can also be seen from table 1 where 
we show the standard deviations of the output gap and inflation in the two models. 
Again this has to do with the minimal inertia assumed in the underlying structural 
  12model. Much of the attempt to fit the rational expectations model (DSGE-models) has 
consisted in adding additional lags so as to produce more persistence and less short-
term volatility.  
 
  Figure 2: Output gap and inflation in the rational model 







































Table 1 : Standard deviations of output gap and inflation 
behavioral model  rational model 
     
output  gap     0.86    1.35 
inflation     0.56    0.89 
Note: these standard deviations are the averages obtained from simulating the model 1000 




2.3 Impulse responses in the behavioral and the rational model 
 
The next step in the analysis is to compute the impulse responses to shocks. Here we 
focus on the impulse responses to an interest rate shock, defined as plus one standard 
deviation of the shock in the Taylor equation.  
  13The peculiarity of the behavioral model is that for the same parameters of the model 
the impulse responses are different for each realization of the stochastic shocks. This 
contrasts with the rational expectations model where the impulse response functions 
are not sensitive to the realization of the stochastic shocks (keeping the parameters 
unchanged). We will return to this difference and give it an interpretation.   
Figure 3 shows the mean impulse responses to an interest rate shock. We constructed 
the mean response by simulating the model 100 times with 100 different realizations 
of the shocks. We then computed the mean response together with the standard 
deviations. Figure 3 shows the mean response (the dotted lines are the mean response 
+ and – 2 standard deviations; note also that we introduced the shock after 100 
periods). We obtain the standard result of an interest rate shock on output and 
inflation. However, the uncertainty surrounding this result is considerable at least in 
the short run.  
Where does this uncertainty come from? Not from parameter uncertainty. We use the 
same parameters in constructing all our impulse responses. The answer is that in this 
behavioral model each realization of the shocks creates different waves of optimism 
and pessimism (animal spirits). We could also call these “market sentiments”. Thus a 
shock that occurs in period 100 in one simulation happens in a different market 
sentiment than the same shock in another simulation. In addition, the shock itself 
affects market sentiments. As a result, the short-term effects of the same interest rate 
shock become very hard to predict. In section 2.6 we elaborate further on this theme 
and illustrate how particular differences in “market sentiments” affect the impulse 
responses to shocks. 
Another way to interpret this result is to say that the timing of the shock is important. 
The same shocks applied at different times can have very different short-term effects 
on inflation and output. In other words, history matters. Note that the uncertainty 
about the impulse responses tends to disappear in the long run, as the effect of short-








  14Figure 3: Mean impulse responses to interest rate shock in the behavioral model 
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mean impulse response inflation
 

















mean impulse response interest rate
 
Note: The dotted lines represent the impulse responses with +/- 2 standard deviations 
 
This difference in the nature of uncertainty in a behavioral and a rational expectations 
model has everything to do with the fact that the former has non-linear features while 
the latter is linear. Thus the additional uncertainty produced by the behavioral model, 
i.e. the dependence of the impulse response functions on the state of the economy is 
the outcome of its non-linearity. Rational expectations models including the DSGE-
  15models traditionally impose some linearization procedure. This is done for the sake of 
mathematical simplicity. It leads to a problem though. If the microfoundation of the 
model leads to a non-linear model, it is important to know how this non-linearity 
(which is part of the micro-foundation) affects the dynamics generated by the model. 
Eliminating these non-linearities amounts to destroying information that is relevant to 
predict the transmission of shocks. This may not matter much for the long run, but 
since the DSGE-models have the ambition of forecasting the transmission process, it 
is of significant importance.  
 
  
2.4 The extended behavioral model 
 
In this section we extend the behavioral model by allowing the inflation forecasters to 
be heterogeneous. We follow Brazier et al. (2006) in allowing for two inflation 
forecasting rules. One rule is based on the announced inflation target (as in the 
previous section); the other rule extrapolates inflation from the past into the future. 
One may argue that this is quite a different pair of heuristics than in the case of output 
forecasting. The difference between inflation forecasting and output forecasting is that 
in the former case there is a central bank that announces a particular inflation target. 
This target works as an anchor for the forecasts of agents. Such an anchor is absent in 
the case of output forecasting.  
The “inflation targeters” use the central bank’s inflation target to forecast future 
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The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.  
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  16We use the same selection mechanism as in the previous section based on the mean 
squared forecasting errors produced by the two rules to determine the proportions of 
agents trusting the inflation target and those who do not trust it and revert to 
extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.  
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This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to find 
out how credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible, using 
the announced inflation target will produce good forecasts and as a result, the 
proportion of agents relying on the inflation target will be high. If on the other hand 
the inflation target does not produce good forecasts (compared to a simple 
extrapolation rule) it will not be used much and therefore the proportion of agents 
using it will be small.  
We calibrated the model using the same parameters as in the previous section. We 
first show the results in the time domain and then discuss the impulse response 
functions.  
Figure 4 presents the results for the output gap in the time domain. We find the same 
cycles in the output gap as in the previous section. Again these cycles are related to 
the waves of optimism and pessimism in the forecasting (second panel in figure 4).  
The results concerning the time path of inflation are shown in figure 5. We first 
concentrate on the second panel of figure 5. This shows the proportion of 
“extrapolators”, i.e. the agents who do not trust the inflation target of the central bank. 
We can identify two regimes. There is a regime in which the proportion of 
extrapolators fluctuates around 50% which also implies that the proportion of 
forecasters using the inflation target as their guide (the “inflation targeters”) is around 
50%. This is sufficient to maintain the rate of inflation within a narrow band of 
approximately + and – 1% around the central bank’s inflation target. There is a 
second regime though which occurs when the extrapolators are dominant. During this 
regime the rate of inflation fluctuates significantly more. Thus the inflation targeting 
  17of the central bank is fragile. It can be undermined when forecasters decide that 
relying on past inflation movements produces better forecast performances than 
relying on the central bank’s inflation target. This can occur quite unpredictably as a 
result of stochastic shocks in supply and/or demand.  
 
  Figure 4: Output gap in the extended behavioral model  








































Figure 5: Inflation in the extended behavioral model 

































  18How can the central bank strengthen the inflation targeting regime?  We take up this 
issue in sections 4 and 5 where we analyze the tradeoffs between output and inflation 
variability and the welfare implications.    
 
 
2.5 Impulse responses in the extended behavioral model 
 
In this section we present the impulse responses to a positive interest rate shock of 
one standard deviation. Two results stand out (see figure 6). First the uncertainty 
surrounding the effects of interest rate shocks is greater and lasts longer than in the 
simple behavioral model with homogenous inflation forecasting. Second, there is in 
this extended model considerably more inertia in inflation adjustment than in output 
adjustment following the interest rate shock. This feature whereby there is more 
inertia in inflation adjustment than in output adjustment after a shock is routinely 
found in VAR estimates of interest rate surprises. The inertia generated by the model 
finds its origin in the evolutionary process inherent in the fitness criterion guiding the 
selection of forecasting rules




Figure 6: Mean impulse responses to an interest rate shock in the extended 
behavioral model  
 
















mean impulse response output
 
                                                 
5 A similar result was obtained by Anagastopoulos, et al. (2006) 


















mean impulse response inflation
 




















2.6 Market sentiments and impulse responses 
An important finding of our model is the dependence of the impulse responses on the 
initial conditions. This implies that the transmission of shocks depends on the exact 
timing of these shocks. The reason is that “market sentiment” changes continuously 
thereby changing the transmission of these shocks.  
There are two sources of “market sentiment” in the model. One originates with the 
waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) produced by the switching 
dynamics between optimistic and pessimistic rules in forecasting output. The second 
one arises from the switches between the two inflation forecasting rules, producing 
periods of confidence in the inflation target announced by the central bank and 
periods of skepticism about this inflation target.  
In this section we discuss with a few representative examples the nature of this 
dependence of the transmission mechanism on market sentiments. We start with 
presenting two impulse responses to the same interest rate shock (a one standard 
deviation increasing in the interest rate). These two shocks occur when the market 
sentiments are very different. We show the results in figure 7. The left hand panel 
shows the impulse response of inflation to an interest rate increase that occurs when 
  20the market is skeptical about the announced inflation target. This can be seen by the 
fact that when the shock occurs (in period 100), almost all agents have become 
extrapolators, i.e. they have lost confidence in the inflation target. The right hand 
panel shows the impulse response when the interest rate shock occurs at a time when 
the weight of extrapolators is low. This is a regime characterized by confidence in the 
inflation target.  
The results are striking. When the market is skeptical about the inflation target the 
interest rate shock has a substantial effect on inflation, while when the market exhibits 
confidence in the inflation target the same interest rate increase has only a very small 
effect on the rate of inflation. Conversely, since the impulse responses are symmetric, 
a decline in the interest rate has a strong positive effect on inflation when the market 
is skeptical and a weak effect on inflation when the market is confident in the 
inflation target. This result is akin to the stabilization bonus obtained in a fully 
credible inflation targeting regime.   
 
 
Figure 7: Impulse responses of inflation to interest rate shock (increase) 
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impulse response inflation to interest rate
















impulse response inflation to interest rate
 
 
  21This dependence of the impulse responses on the market sentiments is also obtained 
when demand and supply shocks occur. We show an example involving a supply 
shock in figure 8. The left hand panel exhibits the impulse response of output to a 
supply shock when the market sentiments about output growth are optimistic, while 
the right hand panel shows the same impulse response when the market sentiments are 
pessimistic. Again the results are striking. When optimists prevail a negative supply 
shock has a significantly lower and shorter-lived negative effect on output than when 
pessimists dominate the market. 
 
Figure 8:  Impulse responses of output to supply shock 
 Optimism        Pessimism 


























































impulse response output to supply shock



















impulse response output to supply shock
 
 
3. Endogenous and exogenous inertia 
 
Business cycle movements in the DSGE-models arise as a result of exogenous shocks 
(in productivity and preferences) and lags in the transmission of these shocks to 
output and inflation. Thus inertia in output and inflation are the result of the lagged 
transmission of exogenous shocks.  
  22In a way it can be said that the lags in the transmission mechanism introduce an 
exogenous, some may say an ad-hoc, element into the logic of the DSGE-model. To 
give an example, Calvo pricing in which firms are constrained to adjust prices 
instantaneously (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001)) is routinely imposed in 
DSGE models. It is clear, however, that such a restriction comes from outside the 
logic of the model. In a world where everybody understands the model and each 
other’s rationality, which is at the core of the DSGE-models, agents would want to go 
immediately to the optimal plan using the optimal price.  They would not want to 
accept such a restriction
6.   
One could call the inertia (and the business cycles) introduced in the DSGE-model 
exogenously created phenomena. In contrast, the behavioral model presented here is 
capable of generating inertia (and business cycles) without imposing lags in the 
transmission process. This could be called endogenous inertia. We illustrate this 
difference by analyzing the behavioral and the rational model in the absence of lags in 
the transmission process in the demand and the supply equations. We achieve this by 
setting the parameters of the forward looking variables a1 = 1 in equation (1) and b1 = 
1 in equation (2). We then applied the same i.i.d. shocks in both the behavioral and 
the rational model and computed the autocorrelation coefficients of the simulated 
series of output gaps and inflation. We show the results in table 2. We observe that the 
behavioral model produces inertia (positive autocorrelation) in the output gap and in 
inflation even if there are no lags in the transmission of shocks. Our rational model 
produces no inertia in the output gap and in inflation.  
Table 2 also shows the autocorrelation coefficients obtained in models that assume 
lags in the transmission. These coefficients are obtained when we set a1 = 0.5 in 
equation (1) and b1 = 0.5 in equation (2). These are also the numerical values assumed 
in all the simulations reported in the previous sections. We now observe that inertia in 
the output gap and in inflation increases in both models. However, it can be concluded 
that all of the inertia obtained in the rational model is the result of the lags in the 
                                                 
6 The use of Calvo-pricing rules is often justified by invoking institutional restrictions that limit the 
freedom of action of individual firms. The question arises why rational and perfectly informed agents 
would accept institutions that limit their freedom to set optimal plans. After all, it is against their own 
interest to accept such limitations. It is not only against the interests of the firms, but also of consumers 
and workers, who in the rational macroeconomic models are agents who perfectly understand the world 
and their own interests and will always want to optimize their utilities. Any limitation on their 
optimizing behaviour reduces their welfare. 
  23transmission process. This is not the case in the behavioral model where most of the 
inertia is produced endogenously.  
We also note from table 2 that even when the coefficients a1 and b1 of the forward 
looking variables of the model are set at 0.5, the rational model produces less inertia 
than the behavioral model. We explore the sensitivity of the autocorrelation 
coefficients  to these parameters more exhaustively in figure 9. This shows the 
autocorrelation coefficients as a function of a1 and b1.  We observe that in the 
behavioral model the autocorrelation coefficients are not very sensitive to the a1 and 
b1.   This contrasts a great deal with the results of the rational model, where the 
sensitivity is very high. When a1 and b1 are close to 1 (i.e. no or weak lags in the 
transmission) the autocorrelation coefficients are very low (very low inertia). In order 
to produce inertia in the rational model which is of the same magnitude as in the 
behavioral model, a1 and b1 must be smaller than 0.5.   
This difference between the two models is quite fundamental. In the rational model 
there is no uncertainty about how the shock is transmitted in the model. Thus in the 
absence of lags in the transmission, agents immediately find the optimal levels of 
output and inflation. In order to produce the required inertia (and the business cycle 
movements), lags in the transmission preventing instantaneous adjustment to the 
optimal plan, are necessary. In the behavioral model, agents do not fully understand 
how the shock will be transmitted. As a result they follow a procedure (heuristics 
together with a selection mechanism) that functions very much like a “trial and error” 
mechanism aimed at revealing the information about shocks and the transmission 
process. This is a slow process that also uses backward evaluation processes. It 
generates an endogenous inertia (and business cycle) into the model.  
The inertia obtained in our behavioral model could also be called informational 
inertia. In contrast to the rational expectations model, agents in the behavioral model 
experience an informational problem. They do not do not fully understand the nature 
of the shock nor its transmission. It takes time for them to understand. This cognitive 
problem then creates the inertia in output and prices. Thus we obtain very different 
theories of the business cycles in the two models
7
                                                 
7 Critics of the heuristic model presented here may argue that the comparison between the rational and 
the heuristic model is unfair for the rational model. Indeed the heuristic model generates inertia 
because the evaluation and selection process of the different heuristics is backward looking. This is the 
  24These differences also have policy implications. In the DSGE-models now favoured 
by central banks, business cycle movements in output and prices originate from price 
and wage stickiness. In order to reduce this kind  of volatility more flexibility in 
prices and  wages  is required. That’s why many central banks call for more 
flexibility. In a more flexible world, central banks will not be called upon so often to 
stabilize output, and thereby set price stability at risk. 
In our behavioral model, business cycle movement in output arise from informational 
lags. Thus, even if prices and wages become more flexible, this will not necessarily 
reduce the business cycle movements in output. As a result, society’s desire to 
stabilize output will not be reduced. And central banks that inevitably respond to these 
desires will face the need to stabilize output at the risk of reducing price stability.  
   
 
Table 2 : Autocorrelation coefficients in output gap and inflation 
No lags in transmission     
    behavioral  model  rational  model 
 
output  gap     0.77    0.07 
inflation     0.69    -0.02 
 
Lags in transmission 
    behavioral  model  rational  model 
 
output  gap     0.89    0.79 
inflation     0.90    0.61 
 
Note: the autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from simulating the model 









                                                                                                                                            
reason why the heuristic model does not need lags in the transmission process to generate inertia. 
However, we claim that this evaluation and selection process can only be backward looking, and as a 
result, the lags that are present in the heuristic model are within the logic of that model. This contrasts 
with the lags introduced in the rational model: they come from outside the model. See Milani(2007b) 
who makes a similar point contrasting rational expectations models with learning models.  
 
  25Figure 9: Autocorrelation coefficients of output gap and inflation 
 
 Behavioral  model     Rational  model 


































































































Note: see note of table 1; we have always set a1 = b1  
  
 
4. Trade-offs between inflation and output variability 
In this section we analyze the tradeoff between output and inflation variability in the 
context of the extended behavioral model. 
We construct the tradeoffs as follows. In figure 10 we show how output variability 
(panel a) and inflation variability (panel b) change as we increase the output 
coefficient (c2) in the Taylor rule from 0 to 1. Each line represents the outcome for 
different values of the inflation coefficient (c1) in the Taylor rule.  
Panel a showing the evolution of output variability exhibits the expected result, i.e. as 
the output coefficient increases (inflation targeting becomes less strict) output 
variability tends to decrease. One would now expect that this decline in output 
variability resulting from more active stabilization comes at the cost of more inflation 
variability. This, however, is not found in panel b. We observe that the relationship is 
non-linear. As the output parameter is increased from zero, inflation variability first 
declines. Only when the output parameter increases beyond a certain value (around 
0.5) inflation variability starts increasing. Thus the central bank can reduce both 
  26output and inflation variability when it moves away from strict inflation targeting 
(c2=0) and engages in some output stabilization. Not too much though. Too much 
output stabilization turns around the relationship and increases inflation variability.  
   
Figure 10: Output and inflation variability 
Panel a 






















































Figure 10 allows us to construct the tradeoffs between output and inflation variability. 
We show these in figure 11 for different values of the inflation parameter c1. Take the 
tradeoff AB. This is the one obtained for c1=1. We start from point A on the tradeoff. 
In point A, the output parameter c2=0 (strict inflation targeting). As output 
stabilization increases we first move downwards. Thus increased output stabilization 
  27by the central bank reduces output and inflation variability. The relation is non-linear, 
however. At some point, with too high an output stabilization parameter, the tradeoff 
curve starts increasing, becoming a “normal” tradeoff, i.e. a lower output variability is 
obtained at the cost of increased inflation variability.  
Note that increasing the inflation parameter in the Taylor rule has the effect of shifting 
the tradeoffs downwards, i.e. the central bank can improve the tradeoffs by reacting 
more strongly to changes in inflation
8. Note, though that there is diminishing return in 
increasing the inflation parameter. When c1 comes close to 2, further increases have a 
smaller impact on the tradeoffs.     
Figure 11: Trade-offs in the extended behavioral model  



































How can we interpret these results? Let’s start from the case of strict inflation 
targeting, i.e. the authorities set c2=0. There is no attempt at stabilizing output at all. 
The ensuing output variability intensifies the waves of optimism and pessimism 
(Animal spirits). These larges waves lead to higher inflation variability. Thus, some 
output stabilization is good; it reduces both output and inflation variability by 
preventing too large swings in animal spirits. With no output stabilization at all (c2=0) 
the forces of animal spirits are so high that the high output variability also increases 
inflation volatility through the effect of the output gap on inflation (supply equation).  
                                                 
8 A similar result on the importance of strict inflation is also found in Gaspar, Smets and 
Vestin(2006) who use a macromodel with statistical learning.   
  28Too much output stabilization, however, reduces the stabilization bonus  provided by 
a credible inflation target. When the central bank attaches too much importance to 
output stabilization it creates more scope for better forecasting performance of the 
inflation extrapolators, leading to more inflation variability.  .  
These results are obtained in a regime in which inflation targeting is imperfectly 
credible. It may be useful to compare these with those obtained in a regime of perfect 
credibility of the inflation target. This is the regime which was implicit in the simple 
behavioral model of the previous section. We show the tradeoff obtained in this 
regime of perfect credibility in figure 12. The contrast with figure 11 is striking. Both 
the variability of inflation and output are now much lower. In addition, inflation 
variability is independent from output variability. In other words the tradeoffs are 
horizontal lines. (Note also that they are essentially the same for all values of the 
inflation coefficient in the Taylor rule). This result should not really be surprising. 
When inflation targeting is perfectly credible, the central bank profits from a 
stabilization bonus, allowing it to reduce output volatility without paying a price in 
terms of a higher inflation variability.  
Figure 12: Trade-offs in the simple behavioral model  

























The comparison of figures 11 and 12 leads to the following conclusion. An inflation 
targeting regime that is 100% percent credible reduces the volatility of inflation and 
output dramatically. The fundamental reason is that it greatly reduces the scope for 
biased  and correlated beliefs to create waves of optimism and pessimism that affect 
output and inflation. If inflation targeting is less than fully credible, these waves of 
  29optimism and pessimism are more difficult to control producing larger volatility of 
output and inflation. In such a regime active output stabilization helps to reduce 
output and inflation variability.   
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we analyse how sensitive the results are to different numerical values 
of the “learning parameters” in the model. These are the parameters describing how 
agents use and select forecasting rules. There are three such parameters in our model. 
First, there is the divergence between the optimists’ and pessimists’ beliefs. We 
analyze the sensitivity to the coefficient β in equation (6) which measures the 
sensitivity of the divergence of beliefs to output uncertainty. 
Second, there is the memory agents have when calculating the performance of their 
forecasting. This was represented by the parameter ωk  in equations (9)-(10) and is a 
series of declining weights attached to past forecast errors. We define     
(and 
k
k ρ ρ ω ) 1 ( − =
1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ ). The parameter ρ can be interpreted as a measure of the memory of 
agents. When  ρ  = 0 there is no memory; i.e. only last period’s performance matters 
in evaluating a forecasting rule; when ρ  = 1 there is infinite memory.  
Finally, there is the parameter γ  which measures the intensity with which agents are 
willing to switch to a better performing rule (see equations (11)-(12)).  
We discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to these parameters by showing 
how these parameters affect the volatility of inflation and output, and the degree of 
inertia (autocorrelation) in these variables.  
 
5.1 Sensitivity to divergence in beliefs 
 
The upper panels of figure 12 show how the volatility of output and inflation depends 
on the degree to which the divergence in beliefs depends on output volatility. We 
observe that when divergence increases, the volatility of output and inflation increases 
substantially. The lower panels of figure 12 indicate that increasing divergence tends 





  30Figure 12: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 
 

























































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 
simulating the model 1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
 
 
5.2 Sensitivity to memory 
The memory agents use when they evaluate their past performance, plays an 
important role in the dynamics of the model. This is illustrated by figure 13. The 
upper part shows the volatility of output and inflation for different values of the 
memory parameter (ρ). It is striking to find that with increasing memory the volatility 
of these variables declines significantly. Note however that the relationship is non-
linear. One needs a large value of ρ for the volatility to start declining. In the 
simulations presented in the previous sections we set ρ=0.5. The volatility obtained 
for this parameter value is very close to the volatility obtained when ρ=0 (i.e. when 
agents have no memory and only the performance of the last period).  
We obtain similar results with the autocorrelation coefficients of output and inflation. 
For low and medium values of  ρ the autocorrelation coefficients are relatively 
constant. One needs a sufficiently large value of the memory parameter to reduce the 
  31autocorrelation coefficients significantly.  We conclude that long memory tends to 
stabilize output and inflation and to reduce inertia in these variables.  
 
Figure 13: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 





























































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 
simulating the model 1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
 
 
5.3 Sensitivity to intensity of choice 
The intensity of choice parameter controls the degree with which agents switch from 
one rule to the other when the performance of the forecasting rules change. In general 
we find that, as this parameter increases, volatility and inertia tend to increase.  This is 
illustrated in figure 14. The upper panel shows the volatility of output and inflation as 
a function of the intensity of choice parameter. We observe a clear positive relation. 
The lower panel shows how the autocorrelation coefficients increase when intensity 
of choice is increased.  
We conclude that as agents react more forcefully to changes in performance of their 





  32Figure 14: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output gap and inflation 





























































































Note: the standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients are the averages obtained from 
simulating the model 1000 times, each time over 1000 periods. 
 
 
6. Steady state properties of the model 
In this section we analyze the steady state properties of the model. We do this by 
mapping the space of attractors in the following way. First, we set all stochastic 
variables equal to zero. Second, we give an initial shock to output gap and inflation, 
respectively and we collect the attractor(s) to which the model converges. We repeat 
this exercise for different values of the Taylor rule parameters (c1 and c2). We show  
the results in figure 15, which 15 shows  the attractors for the output gap. On the 
horizontal x-axis we present the initial disturbance given to the output gap. On the 
horizontal y-axis we show the different values of c2 for which the attractors were 
computed. Finally the vertical axis shows the attractors, i.e. the values of the output 
gap to which that variable returns after the initial shock. We observe the following 
interesting results. In the case of (imperfect) credibility of inflation targeting, the 
output gap returns  to a steady state value of 0, whatever the initial shock. This is  not 
the case when inflation targeting has no credibility. In that case we have two types of 
attractors. A fixed attractor equal to zero to which the output gap returns if the initial 
  33shock is not too large, and a periodic attractor to which the output gap converges if 
the initial shocks is large enough. Thus when inflation targeting has no credibility a 
sufficiently large enough disturbance will force the output gap on a cyclical path of 
booms and busts. We show an example of such a path in figure 16 
Figure 15 also reveals an interesting aspect of the effects of output stabilization as 
measured by the coefficient c2. We observe that as c2 increases the space of fixed 
point attractors increases, and the amplitude of the cyclical movements in the output 
gap declines. We explore this feature further in figure 17 which shows the phase 
diagram of the output gap when it has converged to the periodic attractor. We show 
these phase diagrams for increasing values of c2. It can be seen that the phase 
diagrams shrink with increasing values of c2. For values of c2 of 0.6 or higher the 
output gap converges to a fixed attractor equal to 0.  
 
Figure 15: Steady state attractors of the output gap 
 Imperfect  credibility       No  credibility 
 
 
Figure 16: Cyclical movements of output in a deterministic simulation after an 
initial shock of +0.03 (c1=1.5 and c2=0.2) 

















  34Figure 17: Phase diagrams of the output gap (no credibility) 
c2=0.2       c2=0.4 
 
  c2=0.6       c2=0.8 
 
 
We repeated a similar exercise for inflation and obtained very similar results. They 
are shown in appendix b. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The idea that the business cycle is driven by waves of optimism and pessimism has a 
long tradition. It was made popular by Keynes who called these waves “animal 
spirits”. Outside academia, this idea continues to enjoy a wide acceptability in 
explaining movements in economic activity.  
As a result of the systematic incorporation of rational expectations in macroeconomic 
theory the idea that waves of optimism and pessimism can have an independent 
influence on economic activity has been discarded from academic thinking. The 
  35DSGE-models which have now achieved a near monopoly in macroeconomics, view 
business cycles as the result of a combination of exogenous shocks and slow 
transmission of these shocks into output and prices. In these models there is no place 
for endogenously generated business cycles.   
The problem of the DSGE-models (and more generally of macroeconomic models 
based on rational expectations) is that they assume extraordinary cognitive 
capabilities of individual agents. Recent developments in other disciplines including 
psychology and brain science document that individual agents struggle with limited 
cognitive abilities, restricting their capacity to understand the world. As a result, 
individual agents use small bits of information and simple rules to guide their 
behaviour.  
We have used these new insights to extend the DSGE-model framework to an 
environment in which agents use simple rules to forecast output and inflation. In order 
to provide discipline in the use of these rules we have introduced a mechanism that 
allows for the selection of those rules that are more profitable than others.  
The ensuing “behavioral model” produces a number of results that distinguishes it 
from the rational expectations models. First, the behavioral model creates correlations 
in beliefs which in turn generate waves of optimism and pessimism. The latter 
produce endogenous cycles which are akin to the Keynesian “animal spirits”. Second, 
due to its non-linearity, the behavioral model produces a degree of uncertainty about 
the transmission of monetary policy shocks that is different from the uncertainty 
obtained in DSGE-models. In the latter linear models, uncertainty about the effects of 
monetary policy shocks arises only because of the lack of precision in the estimation 
of the structural parameters of the model. In the behavioral model there is an 
additional dimension to uncertainty. This is that the same policy shock can have 
different effects depending on the state of the economy, including the degree of 
optimism and pessimism agents have about the future. As a result, the effectiveness of 
policy shocks depends on the timing of these shocks. This is an insight not found in 
mainstream DSGE-models. True, the DSGE-models can potentially produce similar 
results. However, these have routinely been excluded by linearizing an otherwise non-
linear model.  
  36A third result is that the inflation targeting regime turns out to be of great importance 
to stabilize the economy in a behavioral model. In a regime in which inflation 
targeting is credible inflation and output variability are greatly reduced. The reason is 
that credibility also helps to reduce correlations in beliefs and the ensuing self-
fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism. In a regime of imperfect credibility, 
these waves are more pronounced.  
However, and fourth, strict inflation targeting is not an optimal policy. Some output 
stabilization (given a credible inflation target) also helps in reducing the correlation of 
biased beliefs thereby reducing the scope for waves of optimism and pessimism to 
emerge and to destabilize output and inflation..  
Finally, our model provides for a very different theory of the business cycle as 
compared to the business cycle theory implicit in the DSGE-models. In the DSGE-
models now favoured by central banks, business cycle movements in output and 
prices arise because rational agents cannot adjust their optimal plans instantaneously 
after an exogenous disturbance. Price and wage stickiness prevent such instantaneous 
adjustment. As a result, these exogenous shocks produce inertia and business cycle 
movements.   
In contrast to the rational expectations model, agents in the behavioral model 
experience an informational problem. They do not do not fully understand the nature 
of the shock nor its transmission. It takes time for them to understand. This cognitive 
problem then creates the inertia in output and prices. Thus we obtain a very different 
theory of the business cycles.   
These differences also have policy implications. In order to reduce output volatility in 
the DSGE-models more flexibility in prices and wages is required. That’s why many 
central banks call for more flexibility of wages and prices. In a more flexible world, 
central banks will not be called upon so often to stabilize output, and thereby set price 
stability at risk. 
In our behavioral model, business cycle movement in output arise from informational 
lags. Thus, even if prices and wages become more flexible, this will not necessarily 
reduce the business cycle movements in output. As a result, society’s desire to 
stabilize output will not be reduced. And central banks that inevitably respond to these 
desires will face the need to stabilize output at the risk of reducing price stability.  
  37The research presented in this paper should be considered to be preliminary. In order 
to be convincing as an alternative modeling strategy, a rigorous empirical evaluation 
of the model will be necessary, whereby the predictions of the model are confronted 
with the data. In addition, the menu of heuristics which is extremely small in this 
paper, will have to be broadened so that the selection of the “fittest” rules can occur 
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Figure A1: Steady state attractors for inflation 
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Figure A2: Phase diagrams of inflation (initial shock is 0.03; no credibility) 
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